Robert D. Radcliffe v. Sia Akhavan and Does 1 through 10 : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Robert D. Radcliffe v. Sia Akhavan and Does 1
through 10 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard D. Burbidge; Douglas H. Holbrook; Burbidge & Mitchell; Attorneys for Appellee.
Paul M. Durham; G. Richard Hill; Durham, Evans & Jones; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Radcliffe v. Akhavan, No. 920883 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4899
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Robert D. Radcliffe, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Sia Akhavan, an individual; 
Joel M. Lasalle, an individual; 
General Display Corporation, 
a Utah corporation; and Does 1 
through 10, inclusive, 
Defendants and Appellee 
Sia Akhavan, 
Counterclaimant and 
Appellee, 
v. 
Robert D. Radcliffe; Republic 
International Corporation; 
Roland Kaufmann; and Does 1 
through 10, inclusive, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
and Appellant, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, District Judge. 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. Paul M. Durham, Esq. 
Douglas H. Holbrook, Esq. G. Richard Hill, Esq. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Attorneys for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
" 1 0 31993 
Case No. 920883-CA 
Priority No. 15 
\?i;.y, C 3 ' ^ T OF A7PEALS 
t 
\ 
•> qzOUZ 
Du-w: i . -' 
APPE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 1 
INTRODUCTION .' 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. Motion for Continuance . . . . . 2 
A. Standard of Review 2 
B. Request for Evidentiary Hearing 3 
II. Default Judgment 4 
III. Finding of Fact on Jurisdiction 6 
IV. Damages 7 
CONCLUSION 7 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 
(Utah App. 1989) 6 
Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons. 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990) 4 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987) 6 
Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977) 2 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992) 3 
RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 60(b) 4 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance §4 (1990) 2 
7 Moore's Federal Practice 560.29 (1993) 5 
11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§2871 (1973) 5 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Robert D. Radcliffe, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Sia Akhavan, an individual; 
Joel M. Lasalle, an individual; 
General Display Corporation, 
a Utah corporation; and Does 1 
through 10, inclusive, 
Defendants and Appellee 
Sia Akhavan, 
Counterclaimant and 
Appellee, 
v. 
Robert D. Radcliffe; Republic 
International Corporation; 
Roland Kaufmann; and Does 1 
through 10, inclusive, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
and Appellant, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The issue relating to the finality of the default judgment in 
favor of Akhavan for purposes of appeal is governed by Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Case No. 920883-CA 
Priority No. 15 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Akhavan has raised several new matters in his principal brief 
which will be considered in the order presented. At the outset, 
however, it is important to note that the central focus of this 
appeal is not whether the trial court was justified in exercising 
personal jurisdiction over Roland Kaufmann, but whether Kaufmann 
was unreasonably denied a fair opportunity to contest and rebut 
Akhavan's one-sided testimony not only on jurisdiction, but on 
liability and damages as well. Brief of Appellant at 26-36. The 
outcome of the trial held in Kaufmann's absence vividly 
demonstrates the degree to which he was prejudiced by the court's 
denial of his motion for continuance. Brief of Appellant at 39-44. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Motion for Continuance. 
A. Standard of Review 
Akhavan mistakenly claims that Kaufmann has ignored the 
standard of review on motions for continuance in this case. Brief 
of Appellee at 11. On the contrary, it is not the standard of 
review, but its proper application that is involved. The question 
is what factors should be considered by a reviewing court to 
determine whether a lower court has abused its discretion by acting 
unreasonably under the circumstances. 
Kaufmann respectfully submits that the relevant factors 
to be considered on appellate review are to be drawn from the 
particular facts and circumstances of the case itself. See, e.g./ 
Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977); 17 Am. Jur. 
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2d Continuance §4 (1990). In this instance, one of the 
circumstances not present in Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah 
App. 1992) (relied upon by Akhavan) is the issue of personal 
jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute. Another is the 
status of the appealing party as a foreign, nonresident defendant 
(not plaintiff) residing thousands of miles from the forum. Others 
include the obvious breakdown of the attorney-client relationship 
shortly before trial, together with Kaufmannfs attempts to remedy 
the situation as best he could. See generally, Brief of Appellant 
at 33-36. In short, this is not a case in which the moving party 
lived across the street from the courthouse. Kaufmann should not 
be disadvantaged by the mechanical application of a single Utah 
case which is so different from the particular facts and 
circumstances of his own. 
B. Reguest for Evidentiary Hearing 
Akhavan further claims that Kaufmann should be precluded 
from raising the issue of his due process right to an evidentiary 
hearing on appeal because he failed to reguest such a hearing 
below. Brief of Appellee at 3. Such a claim ignores the clear 
statement on pre-trial procedure by the Utah Supreme Court in these 
cases: 
When jurisdiction turns on the same facts as the 
merits of the case, an evidentiary hearing is 
inappropriate because it infringes on the right to 
a jury trial and is an inefficient use of judicial 
resources (hearing the same evidence twice); in 
such cases—if the plaintiff has made a prima facie 
showing—jurisdiction is determined by trial on the 
merits. 
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Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990), cited in Brief of 
Appellant at 29-31. 
Kaufmann's due process right to an evidentiary hearing is 
clearly relevant as one of the factors involved in his motion for 
continuance. The issue was raised several times below and never 
waived by stipulation or otherwise. Brief of Appellant at 17-18; 
28-31; 39-41. Since jurisdiction turns on the same facts as the 
merits of this case, the issue was properly reserved until trial. 
II. Default Judgment. 
Akhavan claims that Kaufmann is barred from appealing the 
default judgment entered against him because he failed to file a 
post-trial motion to set it aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Brief of Appellee at 14-15. This 
statement of the law governing finality of default judgments is 
erroneous• 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) 
the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
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satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As the plain wording of the text indicates, a Rule 60(b) 
motion is properly taken from a final judgment and does not affect 
the finality of the judgment itself for purposes of appeal. The 
rationale is based upon the extended time periods applicable to 
such motions. 7 Moore's Federal Practice H60.29 (1993). 
In this connection, the parallel federal rule has been 
analyzed as follows: 
An application for relief from a judgment 
under Rule 60(b) also does not extend the time for 
taking an appeal. Even if the court hears and 
denies the motion before the appeal time would have 
run, the appeal must be taken with the prior period 
measured from the date of the judgment, not from 
denial of the motion. If, however, the court 
grants the motion and enters a new judgment, the 
time for appeal will date from the entry of that 
judgment. 
11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2871 (1973) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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The same result has been reached in Utah, In Fackrell v. 
Fackrell, 740 P. 2d 1318 (Utah 1987), for example, the Utah Supreme 
Court flatly stated: "A Rule 60(b) motion does not extend or toll 
the thirty-day period in which appeals in the original action must 
be taken." Jd. at 1319. And in Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), relied upon by Akhavan in 
support of his position, the court's opinion dealt with a 
consolidation of three appeals: (1) Summary judgment dismissing 
Schettler's counterclaim and third-party complaints; (2) Entry of 
default judgment as a sanction together with an award of 
compensatory and punitive damages; and (3) Denial of motion to set 
aside the foregoing default judgment under Rule 60(b). Ici. at 953. 
The court affirmed the trial court's rulings in all three appeals, 
but vacated the awards of general and punitive damages in certain 
respects and remanded for further proceedings below. JEd. Rather 
than treating the Rule 60(b) motion as a condition of appeal, the 
court dealt with the underlying default judgment as a final 
judgment from which an appeal properly could be taken. Xd. at 961. 
Akhavan has cited no case or other authority in support 
of his position, other than those supporting the rule that a 
default judgment may only be set aside at the trial level by a Rule 
60(b) motion. Such a motion is not a condition of appeal of the 
original default judgment itself. 
III. Finding of Fact on Jurisdiction. 
Akhavan goes to great lengths to justify the court's 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann in this case. 
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Brief of Appellee at 16-20. Nowhere in his brief, however, does he 
address Kaufmann's contention that the court's finding and 
conclusion on personal jurisdiction based upon a voluntary 
stipulation of the parties is clearly erroneous. The indisputable 
fact is that no such stipulation exists. 
IV. Damages. 
Akhavan wholly fails to address Kaufmann's contention 
that the court's award of consequential damages in this case 
constituted a double recovery contrary to law. Consequently, there 
is no need to reply on this point. 
CONCLUSION 
Akhavan's assertions that Kaufmann is barred from raising 
issues with respect to his due process right to an evidentiary 
hearing and the court's entry of default judgment against him in 
connection with this appeal are completely without merit. The 
judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial. 
DATED this 9 ^ day of June, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
By: G-^ J^°MA4 
P a u l M. Durham, Esq . 
G. Richard Hill, Esq. 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 538-2424 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Roland Kaufmann 
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